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The Length of the Siege of Masada1
Jonathan Roth
Introduction
The siege of Masada is generally considered a long and arduous one, lasting at 
least four to seven months,2 with estimates of its length ranging as high as three 
years.3 Indeed, the siege has been held up as an example of inspired resistance on 
the part of the Jews, and of persistent tenacity on the part of the Romans.4
The truth is less grandiose. Α careful analysis of the literary and 
archaeological evidence shows that although the arid locale and high cliffs of the 
fortress provided a logistical and engineering challenge for the Romans, 
overcoming them was well within the capability of a single legion and a few 
auxiliary units. Josephus’ account and the topography of the battle site suggest 
that little or no resistance could have been put forth by the small Jewish 
garrison. Certainly there was none that could have significantly delayed the 
Roman operations. The length of the siege was determined entirely by the time 
necessary to build the siege works required to overcome Masada’s natural 
defenses.
In the light of Roman siege technology, there are strong indications that the 
siege was considerably shorter than is presently thought. From the arrival of the 
Roman army at Masada until the fall of the fortress, the time elapsed was
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facilitated by the kind assistance of Hannah Cotton and Ehud Netzer of Hebrew 
University and Eitan Campbell of the National Park Service.
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probably only one or two months. The siege of Masada most likely lasted under 
seven weeks Υ
Only one account of the siege is extant, that in Book 7 of Josephus’ Jewish 
War.5 6 In it, Josephus gives the date of the fall of Masada as Xanthicus 16.7 
While he uses the names of Macedonian months in his works, it has long been 
recognized that Josephus is using them to represent the months of a different 
calendar.8 Scholarly opinion remains divided, however, on whether Josephus 
meant these Macedonian names to represent the Roman (i.e. Julian) calendar, in 
which Xanthicus 16 would be the equivalent of April 16,9 or the Jewish (i.e. 
Babylonian) calendar, in which Xanthicus 16 would be the 16th of Nisan, a 
month which falls between March and April.10
Josephus does not, however, indicate when the siege began, although he does 
in the case of most of the other sieges during the Jewish War.11 The best 
indication of the siege’s length comes from studying the well-preserved 
archaeological remains at the site. The first scholar to analyze the siege using the 
archaeological data was Alfred von Domaszewski, who visited the site in 1897.12 
While he did not speculate on the siege’s length, Domaszewski did note the 
unusual orientation of Camp B, which was later used (by Schulten) as a basis 
for dating the siege’s beginning. According to Roman military practice, the front
5 Whether Masada fell in 73 or 74 AD is a matter of controversy see Eck (n. 2), 
282-9, W. Eck, Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian, 1970, 93ff. (and its 
review by C.P. Jones, in AJP 95, 1974, 89-90), Campbell (n. 2), 156-8, Η. 
Cotton, “The Date of the Fall of Masada: the Evidence of the Masada Papyri”, 
ZPE 78 (1989), 157-62, Cotton and Geiger (n. 2), 21-24; G.W. Bowersock, 
“The Babatha Papyri, Masada and Rome”, JRA 4 (1991), 344.
6 Jos. BJ 7.252-406.
7 According to Jos. BJ 7.401 the mass suicide of the defenders took place on the 
15th, and the Romans entered Masada the next day.
8 B. Niese, “Zur Chronologie des Josephus”, Hermes 28, 1893, 204-5 argued that 
Josephus was using the Tyrian calendar, in which Xanthicus 16 would 
correspond to May 3rd, but this view is no longer tenable. His view that the 
Jews measured the civil year using the Tyrian calendar, and used their own 
calendar only for religious purposes was refuted by Μ. Herr, “The Calendar”, 
Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum, edd. S. Safrai and Μ. 
Stern, Section One: The Jewish People in the First Century, vol. II, 1976, 845, 
who showed that the Jews used only a single calendar in the first century, their 
own. Niese’s date is occasionally still used, e.g. by Ρ. Sijpesteijn, “Flavius 
Josephus and the Praefect of Egypt in 73 AD”, Historia 28/1, 1979, 118. For 
surveys of the problem of Josephus’ dates, see J. Nicols,Vespasian and the 
Partes Flavianae 1978, 42-7, J. Price, Jerusalem Under Siege, 1992, 121-4.
9 Nicols (n. 8), 45, B. Jones, The Emperor Titus, 1984, 65 n. 17, Campbell (n. 
2), 157 n. 1.
10 Price (n. 8), 210-1.
11 Jos. BJ 3.317 (Jotapata), 4.84 (Gamla), 5.99, 6.408 (Jerusalem).
12 R. Briinnow and Α. Domaszewski, Die Provincia Arabia, vol. Ill, 1909, 221 - 
244.
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gate {porta praetoria) of Roman legionary camps should face the enemy.13 The 
Roman Camp B at Masada, however, faces southeast, away from the fortress. 
Domaszewski conjectured that the camp faced the sunrise for the purpose of 
taking auspices.14
In 1929, Christopher Hawkes used aerial photographs of the Roman siege 
camps to study the siege. In a discussion of the length of the siege, he argued 
that the internal stone walls in the camps were foundations for tents, and stated 
that “the Masada camps were obviously not built to winter in, and everything 
points to the use of regulation leather tents.”15 The siege was, in Hawkes’ view, 
a short one, taking place entirely within the spring of one year.16
Adolf Schulten, who visited the site for a month in 1932, wrote the most 
extensive and influential analysis of the Roman siege works to date. He 
maintained that the stone walls were the remains of barracks, which, in his 
opinion, proved that the siege lasted over a winter.17 Following Domaszewski’s 
hypothesis on the orientation of camp B, Schulten attempted to date the siege 
more closely. By comparing the direction of the camp gates with the point of the 
rising sun in winter, Schulten calculated that the siege started sometime between 
September and December and therefore lasted from four and seven months.18 But, 
while ingenious, the argument from orientation is not a reliable clue to the 
siege’s beginning. While, as noted above, it was normal for a camp to face the 
enemy, exceptions were made.19 Schulten himself admitted that Camp B might 
well have been oriented in order to face the supply road leading from the Dead 
Sea.20
Ian Richmond studied the Roman camps carefully in the early 1960s and 
showed conclusively that the internal walls in the camps were originally no more 
that 1.2 meters high.21 Therefore, the remains of the walls could not have been 
those of winter barracks, but were rather tent foundations, intended to give the 
soldiers more room and to keep the tents cooler. The use of tents, rather than 
barracks, strongly suggests a short siege. The stone walls do lend an air of 
permanence to the Roman camps at Masada, particularly in their remarkable state 
of preservation, but the use of stone reflects only the desert environment. In the 
vicinity of Masada, stone was the only building material available. Elsewhere, 
such tent foundations, as well as the camp walls and circumvallation would have 
been built of turf or timber and would long have deteriorated.
There is nothing at all in the archaeological record to indicate a campaign 
over the winter and the lack of storage facilities or drainage ditches in the camps
1 3 [Hyg.] De mun. castr. 56: porta praetoria semper hostem spectare debet.
14 Brünnow and Domaszewski (n. 12), 225.
15 C. Hawkes, “The Roman Siege of Masada”, Antiquity 3, 1929, 204.
16 Hawkes (n. 15), 197, 200.
17 Schulten (n. 2), 97.
18 Ibid., 17-8, 97,102.
19 Veg. Epit. 1.23 notes that when camps are not facing the enemy, they might 
point towards the east or in the direction the army is traveling.
20 Schulten (n. 2), 102-3.
21 Richmond (n. 2), 146.
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suggest a short stay in the area.22 In addition, Israel Shatzman has recently 
argued that the Romans could not have begun the siege before the winter rains 
filled the local springs in December or January.23
The Roman Plan of Attack
Naturally, the strategy used by the Roman commander Flavius Silva would have 
affected the length of the siege. From a military perspective, there was every 
reason for the Romans to press for a quick victory and not to delay their 
assault.24 In the first place, the logistical difficulties of besieging this isolated 
desert fortress were considerable: no local food or fodder was available and all 
provisions had to be transported from depots at Hebron and En Gedi.25 The 
daily ration of the Roman soldier weighed some 1.4 kg., and even assuming the 
non-combatants and laborers needed a smaller ration, say 1 kg. per day, the army 
would have needed over 16 metric tons of provisions, the equivalent of 200 
donkey-loads, per day.26 Josephus notes that there were no local springs and 
water must have been be carried from sources 12-16 km. away.27 Assuming a 
ration of 2 liters per individual per day, the army, including non-combatants and 
civilian laborers would have needed over 26,000 liters of water, another 215 
donkey-loads, each day.28 The fortress of Masada, on the other hand, had ample 
stores of food and water. Thus, starving Masada into submission would have 
been difficult and expensive. Building a siege ramp immediately upon arrival and 
assaulting the walls as soon as possible was the obvious strategy for Silva.
The striking topography of Masada encourages the impression that building a 
siege ramp was a difficult and lengthy matter, and Josephus’ own description
22 Schulten (n. 2), 91, 164 noted that magazines and ditches are present in the 
Roman camps at Numantia in Spain, where the siege lasted over the winter of 
134/133 B.C.
23 I. Shatzman, “The Roman Siege on Masada”, The Story of Masada, ed. G. 
Hurvitz, 1993, 105-120 (Hebrew).
24 Richmond (n. 2), 144.
25 Schulten identifies Hebron as the main Roman supply depot, but the Romans 
may well have established another depot at En Gedi. There are remains of roads 
connecting Camp B to En Gedi (via En Anerva) and Hebron to Camp F, Schulten 
(n. 2), 87-90. The phrourai mentioned in Jos. BJ 7.275 may have been 
intermediary depots on these supply routes.
26 J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War, dissertation: 
Columbia University, 1991, 211, 345.
27 Jos. BJ 7.277-8. The Wadi Sebbe might have contained some water, there is a 
spring at En Aneva about 5 kilometers away and a reservoir was discovered by
Zvi Ilan in 1983 near camp F, but even all these sources together would have 
been insufficient to supply an army of 13,000. There are suitable springs at Ein 
Boqeq, 12 kilometers to the south, and at En Gedi, 16 kilometers to the north. 
Roth (n. 26), 159.28
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emphasizes the fortress’ strong natural position.29 To be sure, from the Dead Sea 
side the fortress is virtually impregnable, with steep cliffs rising 360 meters 
above the plain. The weak point of Masada is apparent, however, even to the 
casual observer. From the west, the distance from the plateau to the summit is 
only 75 meters and there is a gently ascending earthen slope which rises nearly 
to the top of Masada.
In antiquity a wagon road was built up this slope, now covered by the 
remains of the Roman siege ramp. Indeed, the upper part of the road was still 
visible (and usable) until destroyed by a severe earthquake in 1927.30 Building 
a siege ramp up this western slopes was an obvious strategy and one need not 
assume that the Romans waited until they were on the site to decide to 
implement it.31 The building of a ramp from this direction was not a particularly 
difficult task from the point of view of Roman military engineering.
The Attackers and Defenders at Masada
The number of defenders and their strength relative to the Roman force would 
have affected Silva’s decision whether to launch an immediate assault, or to try 
to starve out the fortress. The likelihood of stubborn resistance might have given 
the Roman commander pause, but it is clear from both literary and archaeological 
evidence that the Romans enjoyed overwhelming superiority in numbers, 
equipment and training.
The size of the Roman forces besieging Masada can be estimated fairly 
accurately. Josephus gives the garrison of Judaea after the end of the Jewish War 
as the “Tenth Legion, along with some alae of cavalry and cohorts of [auxiliary] 
infantry.”32 An imperial Roman legion of this period had a paper strength of 
4800 soldiers,33 and the remains of camp B and F are consistent with a full- 
strength legion. The number and size of auxiliary units is more problematic. 
According to a military diploma, the provinces’ auxiliary garrison in 86 A.D. 
was made up of two alae and four cohorts,34 with a nominal strength of 2,240
29 Jos. BJ 7.280.
30 Schulten (n. 2), 170.
31 As do Brünnow and Domaszewski (n. 12), 224 and Schulten (n. 2), 175. Masada 
had long been the site of a Roman garrison (Jos. BJ 2.408) and its topography 
would have been well-known to the military. While the Roman force there was 
massacred at the beginning of the Jewish War, individuals who had served there 
previously were certainly available to Silva. In addition, operations against 
nearby Herodion and Machaeras in the prior years would have provided ample 
opportunities for reconnaissance.
32 Jos. BJ 7.5.
33 J. Roth, “The Size and Organization of the Imperial Roman Legion”, Historia 
43/3, 1994, 346-62.
34 CIL 16.33: two quingenary alae (Ala Veterana Gaetulorum and Ala Ι Thracum 
Mauretania), a milliarian cohort (Cohors Ι Thracum Milliaria), two quingenary
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infantry and 1Ἰ52 cavalry, around 3400 men.35 The Judaean garrison in 73 was 
probably the same or larger than that of 86.36 Units were certainly moved 
between 70 and 86, but while the actual units present in 86 may not have been 
the same as those in 73, since the province was peaceful it was more likely that 
units had been removed than added.
Josephus states that Silva utilized the entire garrison of Judaea.37 The 
Romans had quite regularly placed garrisons around the country during the war, 
made up of units detached from their main force.38 The reason for garrisons was, 
according to Josephus, to “keep the rebels in check and give confidence to the 
peaceful inhabitants on Vespasian’s departure.”39 The situation facing Silva was 
quite different. The rebellion had been over for close to three years, and, if an 
emergency arose, troops could be moved from Masada to any point in the 
country in a few days. There was no compelling reason, therefore, for Silva to 
have left any units behind when he marched to Masada. Of course, the individual 
units may have been somewhat under-strength, and some soldiers left behind on 
administrative duty. Conversely, militia troops may well have accompanied the 
regular army force, to make up for under-strength Roman units.40
Based on the probable size of Judaea’s garrison, and assuming that the entire 
force accompanied Silva, the force which marched on Masada totaled 
approximately 8,000 soldiers. This number agrees in general with the capacity of
cohortes peditatae (Cohors I Augusta Praetoria, Cohors Π Cantabrorum) and one 
cohors equitata (Cohors II Thracum equitata). See Hawkes (n. 15), 203, Cotton 
and Geiger (n. 2), 14-5.
35 Quingenary ala: 512 cavalry ([Hyg.] De mun. castr. 16, Arr. Tact. 18, J. 
Kromayer and G. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegsführung der Griechen und Römer, 
1928, 497-8), quingenary cohors peditata: ([Hyg.] De mun. castr. 28, 
Kromayer-Veith ibid., 495, Ε. Birley, “Alae and Cohortes Milliariae”, in 
Corolla Memoriae Erich Swoboda Dedicata, 1966, 54, R. W. Davies, “Α note on 
a recently discovered inscription from Carrawburgh”, Epigraphische Studien 4, 
1967, 111, milliarian cohort: either 1,000 (Kromayer-Veith ibid. 495, Birley 
ibid. 54) or, more probably, 800 infantry (Davies ibid, 111, cf. [Hyg.] De mun. 
castr. 1.2, 28.6). Α quingenary cohors equitata had 120 cavalry in it ([Hyg.] De 
mun. castr. 24.4-5, Jos. BJ 3.67-8), but the number of infantry is controversial, 
either 360, 380 or, most likely, 480 infantry. If the latter number is correct, the 
total is 600 men (G.L. Cheeseman, The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army, 
1914, 29, Davies, ibid., 110, D.L. Kennedy, “Milliary Cohorts: The Evidence 
of BJ ΙΠ.4.2. (67) and of epigraphy”, ZPE 61, 1985, 253 n. 6).
36 As pointed out by Schulten (n. 2), 85.
37 Jos. BJ 7.252: estrateusan epi touto tên en fois topois dunamin sunagagôn.
38 Jos. BJ 2.507, 3.31-4, 30ὸ, 428-31, 130, 441-2, 446-8, 551, 5.50.
39 Jos. BJ A 120
40 Militia units accompanied the campaigns of Quinctilius Varus in 4 B.C. (Jos. BJ 
2.52) and Cestius Gallus in 66 Α.Γ). (Jos. BJ 2.502-6).
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the two large and six small Roman camps at Masada, which Schulten put at 
8,000, Richmond at ca. 7200 and Yadin at 9,000.41
In addition to the troops, there were non-combatant slaves (calones) 
permanently attached to the Roman army. Schulten estimates their number at 
2,00042 and a ratio of 1:4 consistent with the practices of the first century 
army.43 It is not surprising that quarters for such military slaves are not attested 
archaeologically: they would not have had separate quarters but would have slept 
with the pack animals or with the unit’s gear.
These regular military slaves should be distinguished from the Jews who 
Josephus says carried supplies for the army.44 Yadin calls these individuals 
Jewish “prisoners” and estimated that 6,000 were present at Masada.45 The 
civilian laborers used at Masada were probably not prisoners from the Jewish 
War, which had ended three years previously. Josephus is scrupulous in 
recording the fate of captives. According to him, the Romans took 97,000 
prisoners during the war; Titus pardoned and released 40,000 of them and 
another 11,000 starved to death while in captivity.46 Of the remaining 46,000, 
some were immediately executed or sent to the mines in Egypt,47 “many” 
brought to Caesarea to die in games,48 and a “multitude” (ochlon) transported to 
Rome to march in Vespasian’s triumph.49 The remaining prisoners were sold to 
private slave dealers.50 Josephus does not mention, or imply, the retention of any 
prisoners by the military for labor service or any other purpose, nor was there 
any need for such slaves.51
Both in war and peace the Roman army routinely requisitioned necessary 
labor from free  provincials.52 Thus, the Jews mentioned by Josephus were not 
“prisoners” or “slaves” but rather impressed or corvée labor enlisted for the 
duration of the campaign. These civilian Jewish laborers, serving primarily as 
porters carrying supplies from En Gedi or Hebron, would have been quartered 
and fed in those settlements, where they would have been less of a logistical 
strain on the Roman military.
41 Schulten (n. 2), 86, Richmond (n. 2) 152, Yadin (n. 2), 223. Hawkes (n. 15),
197 put the number at 6,000, but this estimate is based on his notion that an
under-strength Tenth Legion camped first at B, and later moved to F, while in 
fact a full-strength legion was divided between the two camps.
42 Schulten (n. 2), 88.
43 Roth (n. 33), 354-8.
44 Jos. BJ 7.277.
45 Yadin (n. 2), 233. He gave no rationale for this number.
46 Jos. BJ 6.384, 419-20.
47 Jos. BJ 6.386, 417
48 Jos. BJ 7.24-5.
49 Jos. BJ 7Ἰ38.
50 Jos. BJ 6.384, 417.
51 Nor is there reason to think the population as a whole suffered in status, see B. 
Isaac, “Judaea after A.D. 70”, Journal of Jewish Studies 35, 1984, 49-50.
Plut. Brut. 25, Ant. 68, Matthew 27:32, Mark 15:21, Dio Cass. 65.4.5.52
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Roman soldiers almost always built siege works themselves, without any 
civilian labor.53 This was done for security purposes: when a sortie occurred, the 
soldiers working on the ramp were expected to defend it.54 5Civilian workers 
would only get in the way, or worse, assist the enemy in destroying the ramp.
Under normal circumstances, even the work of excavating the enormous 
amount of earth necessary for the ramp and transporting this material to the base 
of the ramp would have been done by soldiers.”  It is likely, though, that some 
Jewish corvée labor was present at Masada. Due to the small military presence at 
Masada and Silva’s wish to prevent escape by placing troops on all sides of the 
fortress, the use of Jewish corvée labor would have been attractive. Requisitioned 
slaves did excavation and transportation work at the siege of Zela in 47 B.C.56 57
There is some archaeological evidence for the presence of this Jewish corvée 
labor at the site. The walled area near the siege ramps, measuring some 1200 
square meters, which Schulten called the Bauplatz,51 was probably not a 
construction site, which would not have needed a wall around it. Rather it is 
more likely to have been a camp for the corvée laborers; without undue 
crowding, it could have accommodated some 3,000 persons.58 In addition, the 30 
so-called canabae found near Camps Ε and F59 were probably not for “camp 
followers and tradesmen” as suggested by Yadin,60 but rather for the civilian 
supervisors of the corvée laborers. This would explain why there are no canabae 
found near camp B or anywhere on the east side of Masada, as the Romans did 
not build siege works in this area.61 Thus, the Roman force at Masada probably 
totaled approximately 13,000 men: 8,000 Roman combatants, 2,000 military 
slaves and 3,000 Jewish corvée laborers.
As for the defenders of Masada, under the command of Eliezar Ben Yair, 
Josephus gives an exact figure: 967 men, women and children.62 While Josephus
53 RE 6.2, 2242, s.v. Festungskrieg (W. Liebenam).
54 Two cohorts, which allowed the siege ramp they were working on at the siege of 
Phraata in 36 B.C. to be burned, were decimated and placed on barley rations, 
Front. Strat. 4.1.37, Plut. Ant. 39.
55 Caes. BGal. 3.25, Jos. BJ 3Ἰ61-5.
56 BAlex. 73.2.5. These slaves come from the immediate vicinity and thus are 
analogous to requisitioning free labor from the locality of Masada, and not with 
the use of prisoners from the Jewish War.
57 Schulten (n. 2), 95, originally suggested by Briinnow and Domaszewski (n. 12) 
224.
58 At the rate of men per square meter indicated in [Hyg.] De mun. castr. 25 about 
6,000 laborers could have fit in this area, but this is without any allowance for 
paths through the camp.
59 Schulten (n. 2), plan XXVIII, Richmond (n. 2), 151.
60 Yadin (n. 2), 224-5.
61 As noted (though misinterpreted) by Hawkes (n. 15) 201.
62 Jos. BJ 7.399-400: 960 victims and seven survivors (two women and five 
children). For the question of numbers in the BJ, see Price (n. 8) 204-9.
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implies that each Sicarius had a wife and children with him in the fortress,63 this 
seems unlikely, and the adult male population may have represented as much as 
50 percent of the total. On the other hand, there were certainly significantly 
numbers of women and children present, as the fortress had doubtless attracted 
refugees and had been the homebase of the Sicarii for several years.
Schulten estimated the Jewish fighting force at 500,64 but this should be 
seen as a maximum figure, and Feldman’s figure of 200-300 defenders is equally 
likely.65 Thus while the Roman military force was relatively small, it vastly 
outnumbered that of the defenders, by a factor of at least sixteen to one, and 
possibly as much as forty to one.
Jewish Resistance
The problem of logistics, the topography of the fortress and the overwhelming 
superiority of the Roman forces certainly would have made a direct assault on 
the fortress the most attractive course available to the Romans. The question 
remains whether theSicarii would have been able to delay Roman construction of 
siege works. As is often the case, the best defense against a siege ramp was the 
offense. In a sortie or eruptio, the defenders sallied forth and attempted to burn 
to attackers’ siege works.66 Even under the best of circumstances, an effective 
sortie is difficult to execute from Masada as there are only three possible places 
of egress, all of which are easily guarded.67 It is true that a sortie had been 
successfully used by the defending Herodians in the siege of Masada in 40-39 
BY, but this had been directed against a relatively small and ill-disciplined 
force.68 The Sicarii at Masada faced the Roman army at the height of its 
effectiveness. The Jewish defenders at Machaerus had also effected sorties,69 but 
while Josephus does not give the size of the defending garrision it was likely to 
have been much larger than that at Masada.
Indeed, it was the small number of defenders at Masada which made 
successful sorties impossible. Even assuming that there were 500 male adult 
defenders at Masada, not all of them would have been available for such attacks.
63 Jos. BJ 7.389: tosoutos autois gunaikôn kai paidiôn kai tês autôn sphagês erôs 
enepesen.
64 Schulten (n. 2), 172.
65 L. Feldman, “Masada: Α Critique of Recent Scholarship”, Christianity, Judaism 
and Other Greco-Roman Cults: Studies for Morton Smith at Sixty, ed. J. 
Neusner, 1975, 239.
66 Veg. Epit. 4.28. This tactic was used at Avaricum (Caes. BGal. 7.22.4), 
Massilia (Caes. BCiv. 2.1.4) and at Jerusalem (Jos. BJ 5.473ff.) see W. 
Wimmel, Die technische Seite von Caesars Unternehmen gegen Avaricum, 
1973, 10.
67 Jos. BJ 7.280, Schulten (n. 2), 92.
68 Jos.A7U.391.
69 Jos. R /7.193.
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The casement wall, which surrounds the top of the plateau and forms the fortress, 
is about 1500 meters in length. Therefore, even with only one guard every thirty 
meters, 50 men would have been on sentry duty at any one time, and another 50 
resting from their watch, leaving at most 400 defenders for sorties.
Roman strategy further reduced the effectiveness of the defenders. Silva 
placed half the Tenth Legion and two cohorts of auxiliaries (a total of about 
3,400 men) in Camps A, B, and C on the eastern side of the fortress. These 
troops covered the Snake Path and Masada’s Eastern Gate, which, if unguarded, 
provided a way into the fortress.70 This threat forced Ben Yai'r to split his forces 
and to deploy some of his men far from the ramp, as evidenced by the “rolling 
stones” found piled near the Snake Path and the southern cliffs.7' Even if Ben 
Yaïr had left only 100 men to guard the Snake Path meant that at most about 
300, and perhaps as few as 100, defenders would have been available for a sortie. 
Such a small attacking force would have had virtually no chance of success. Half 
a legion, 2,400 of the best soldiers in the world, would have been working on 
the ramp at any one time, and some 500 auxiliaries were camped only minutes 
away.
If sorties were not possible, the next best defense against a siege ramp was to 
try to slow down Roman construction by shooting or hurling missiles at the 
attackers. At Masada, however, the defenders were not numerous enough to 
sustain a rate of small missile fire necessary to slow down construction.
If the defenders had possessed a large number of artillery pieces, they might 
have been able to delay, though not stop, construction of the ramp. Vegetius 
noted that artillery could set a siege tower on fire from a distance,72 but such fire 
would have been ineffective against the ramp itself. Unless the defenders 
possessed such artillery in large numbers, they could do little but harass the 
Romans.73 The rebel forces at Jerusalem had captured Roman artillery pieces and 
used them to some effect,74 75but there is little reason to think that the Sicarii 
possessed much, if any, artillery at Masada.
Josephus does not mention any artillery among the stores left there by Herod 
the Great (between 37 ΒὈ. and 4 A .D .y 5 but even if he had, and such pieces
70 Hawkes (n. 15), 199 thought that the Tenth Legion occupied first camp B, to cut 
off the expected flight of the Sicarii and only moved to camp F when resistance 
became obvious. Flight to the west, however, was just as possible, and Hawkes’ 
view has been discredited by excavation. Schulten (n. 2), 100 theorized that the 
placement of camps Α, B, and C was to block escape via the Wadi Sebbe, but the 
Wadi Nimre seems an equally likely escape route.
71 Ε. Smallwood, The Jews Under Roman Rule from Pompey to Diocletian, 1981, 
337, Yadin (n. 2), 156, 163.
72 Veg. Epit. 4Ἰ8, Kromayer and Veith (n. 35) 447.
73 Cf. Aul. Hirt. BGal. 8.4, Veg. Epit. 4Ἰ5.
74 Jos. BJ 5.267.
75 Jos. BJ 7.295-8. For the use of artillery by Herod, see I. Shatzman, “Artillery in 
Judaea from Hasmonean to Roman Times”, in D.H. French and C.S. Lightfoot,
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were still serviceable after 70 years of storage,76 they had probably long been 
removed by the Roman to Caesarea or Jerusalem.77 No legion had been stationed 
in Judaea before 70 and the Roman garrison at Masada in 66 was probably only 
a small detachment of auxiliaries, which probably did not have artillery.78 Israel 
Shatzman has argued that the view that the defenders at Masada lacked artillery 
is based on circumstantial evidence, which is a good point, but he admits that 
such artillery is never directly attested.79 Some of the circumstantial evidence is 
compelling, for example, the siting of camps Ε and F, both of which would have 
been open to artillery fire if the defenders had possessed any.
In any case, Roman military technology provided a number of passive 
defenses against missiles hurled or fired from the summit by the Sicarii. Both 
small missiles such as arrows and most ballista stones and darts would have 
been deflected by the use of plutei and vinei, portable defensive screens placed in 
front of the siege works.80 Josephus makes this point himself in his description 
of the siege of Jotapata.81 Large rolling stones of some 30 cm. diameter were 
discovered stacked at various points along the casement wall and were certainly 
intended to bombard the attackers from above.82 The number of such stones, 
however, must have been limited and both the stones and larger artillery 
ammunition could have been stopped by the wooden palisades {portici, 
musculi), set up to guard the workers at the head of the ramp.83
The Romans also took active measures to prevent interference in the 
construction of the ramp. In order to provide fire cover for the soldiers’ work, the 
Roman built a 60 cubit (27 meter) high tower (purgos).84 Such siege towers 
sometimes contained a battering ram,85 but Josephus makes clear that the
The Eastern Frontiers of the Roman Empire, British Archaeological Reports, 
Internationa] Series, 535/2, 1989, 465-8.
76 It has been argued that artillery pieces could be kept in service for considerable 
periods of time, D. Baatz, “Hellenistische Katapulte aus Ephyra”, Ath. Mitt. 97, 
1982, 232.
77 D. Campbell, “Auxiliary Artillery Revisited”, BJ 186, 1986, 124 n. 54.
78 Auxiliary units were not normally issued artillery, Ε. Marsden, Greek and 
Roman Artillery, 1969, 191, Campbell (n. 77), 117-132. The counterarguments 
of Shatzman (n. 75), 468-74 are not convincing.
79 Shatzman (n. 75), 474-5.
80 For plutei and vinea, see Caes. BGal. 7.25, 41.4, 72.4, Veg. Epit. 4Ἰ5, Τ. 
Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, 1899, 604, Liebenam (n. 53), 2243, 
Kromayer and Veith (n. 35), 444.
81 Jos. BJ 3.163-4.
82 Yadin (n. 2), 156, 163, see Veg. Epit. 4.8.
83 Caes. BCiv. 2.2.3, Tac. Hist. 2.22.9, Veg. Epit. 6Ἰ6, Wimmel (n. 66), 40.
84 Jos. BJ 7.367-9, cf. Sail. lug. 76.3.2, Ο. Lendle, Texte und Untersuchungen 
vom technischen Bereich der antiken Poliorketik, 1983, 192.
85 Vitr. De Arch. 10.3. An example is illustrated on the Arch of Septimius Severus, 
see R. Brilliant, The Arch of Septimius Severus in the Roman Forum, 1967, 
plate 87.
98 THE LENGTH OF THE SIEGE OF MASADA
battering ram at Masada was separate from the siege tower.86 The tower at 
Masada held artillery pieces and archers, to be put into use as soon as the ramp 
approached arrow-shot of the enemy.87 If the reconstruction of the siege ramp by 
Adolf von Lammerer is correct, then the top of the tower would have been at the 
level of the wall as the ramp came within range of the defenders’ bows.88 
Firepower in the siege tower would have effectively eliminated interference from 
the defenders. Archaeology provides dramatic evidence of suppressing fire: the 
300 ballista stones found strewn in a room near the breach, in which the 
defenders had stacked 13 rolling stones, were almost certainly from this Roman 
artillery.89
There is no evidence of effective resistance by the defenders of Masada and 
little reason to think it occurred.90 In Josephus’ description of every other siege 
during the Jewish War, resistance is graphically described, even exaggerated,91 
but the historian does not even mention any resistance by the defenders at 
Masada.92
The Jews certainly had every motive to resist, but simply lacked the means. 
The Romans had every reason to take the fortress of Masada as quickly as 
possible, and they had the means to overcome its defenses in a relatively short 
period. The Romans would have been but little delayed in the erection of their 
siege works and the time allotted for the construction of the siege works should 
correspond closely to the total length of the siege.
The construction of the Roman siege works
The first job of the military arriving at Masada would have been to build and 
improve roads. This was necessary in order to bring in construction material, as 
well as to facilitate the movement of provisions into the area. Josephus describes 
how Vespasian built such a road during the siege of Jotapata.93 This road, which 
ran from Gabara to Jotapata, a distance of some 10 kilometers, was completed by
86 Jos. BJ 7.309: en tautô de kai krion ho Silbas megan kataskeuasamenos...
87 Lendle (n. 84), 71-106.
88 Schulten (n. 2), Plan XIII.
89 Ε. Netzer, Masada III: The Yigael Yadin Excavations: 1963-65, Final Reports. 
The Buildings, Stratigraphy and Architecture, 1991, 419. Shatzman (n. 75), 
474-5 suggests that some of these balls may have been ammunition for Jewish 
artillery. One wonders why the defenders would have held back any ammunition, 
if indeed they had artillery.
90 Richmond (n. 2), 144, Yadin (n. 2), 266, S. Cohen, “Masada: Literary tradition, 
archaeological remains, and the credibility of Josephus”, Essays in Honor of 
Yigael Yadin, edd. G. Vernies and J. Neusner, 1983, 403.
91 Jos. BJ 2.430-440, 533-8, 3Ἰ50-288, 316-25, 6.7Γ97, 266-74, 284-9, 304- 
47, 466-72, 6Ἰ5-23, 157-92, 220-35, 7Ἰ90-200.
92 Of course, this is an argument from silence, as noted by Shatzman (n. 75), 474.
93 Jos. 3.141-2.
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a detached force of infantry and cavalry, the size of which Josephus does not 
give, in four days.
At Masada the Romans constructed a road connecting camp D with camp F, 
and probably the road to Hebron and to En Gedi were improved.94 If the whole 
force was utilized, there is no reason to think that this construction took more 
than about a week.95 It is also possible that work on the roads may have been 
started prior to the arrival of the main force, as was the case with the siege of 
Jotapata.
The circumvallation
Immediately upon the Romans’ arrival at Masada, Silva ordered camps built and 
a circumvallation wall constructed around the fortress.96 The circumvallation at 
Masada measures some 4500 meters in length, with a width of between 1.5 and 
1.8 meters (an average of 1.65 meters). It was probably originally 3 meters high, 
and thus contained about 23,000 cubic meters of stone. In addition, eight 
military camps and one civilian camp (the Bauplatz) were built, some on and 
some near the circumvallation. These totaled some 2,500 meters of wall, probably 
the same height as the circumvallation, but thicker, between 1.8 and 2.4 m. 
(averaging around 2m). The camps therefore contained another 15,000 cubic 
meters, giving a total of close to 38,000 cubic meters for the entire 
circumvallation.
Clearly, any military construction involves various steps carried out at 
varying rates. However, in order to provide a model for discussing the time 
needed to build the siege works at Masada, this study will posit a single 
construction rate in terms of amount of building material amassed per man per 
day. Busolt, in his discussion of the building of the Spartan siege ramp at 
Platea, assumed a construction rate of 1 cubic meter of earth per soldier per 
day,97 a rate which Gomme considered “conservative.”98 This has been the only 
construction rate proposed for the building of siege ramps and while neither 
Busolt nor Gomme gave any rationale for this estimated rate, it is quite 
reasonable and agrees with other evidence.
Modern experiments in the building of ancient earth works support Busolt’s 
rate on construction. At the building of a simulated ditch-and-bank prehistoric 
earth work at Overton Down in southern England in 1960, student volunteers 
using “modern” tools (i.e. pick, shovel and bucket), constructed a rampart at an 
average rate of 3.58 cubic feet per work per hour, the equivalent of almost exactly
94 See note 25.
95 Richmond (n. 2), 153-4.
96 Jos. BJ 7.276.
97 G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeronaeia 111.2: Der 
peloponnesische Krieg, 1904, 965.
98 Α. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Books //-///, 1956, 207.
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1 cubic meter per 10-hour day." The experimental reconstruction of a Roman 
military turf rampart, also constructed in England, but using prisoners as labor, 
gave similar results.9 100
Modern estimates suggest that building with stone takes longer than with 
earth, 1.8 man/days per cubic meter of stone as opposed to one man/day per cubic 
meter of earth.1"1 But according to a speech given to Roman legionaries in 
Africa by Hadrian, the rate of building stone walls and turf walls could be about 
the same, if done by experienced troops.102 It is thus reasonable to infer that the 
work rates at Masada, where military construction was done in stone, would be 
similar to that using turf, given that the Roman troops were very experienced in 
such construction.1®3
8,000 soldiers working at a rate of one cubic meter per day per soldier could 
have completed the entire job in under five days.104 Since there exists some 
overlap between circumvallation and the camp walls, this construction time 
might also be reduced.
Josephus implies that the Romans completed the wall of circumvallation 
before beginning work on the siege ramps, and his narrative strengthens this 
impression by separating his description of these two phases of construction 
with a digression on the fortress and its history.105 It is quite possible, however, 
that construction on the wall of circumvallation and the siege ramp began 
simultaneously, with half the legion and the auxiliaries building the former, and 
the other half of the legion the latter. If so, with fewer hands, the circumvallation 
would have taken seven days to build, but the construction of the ramp could
99 ΡἈ. Jewell ed., The Experimental Earthwork on Overton Down, Wiltshire, 
1960, 1963, 58, D.W.A., “Prehistoric Earthmoving”, Settlement Patterns in 
the Oxford Region, edd. H.J. Case and A.H.R. Whittle, CBA Research Report 
44, London, 1982, 153-6.
100 B. Hobley, “An Experimental Reconstruction of a Roman Military Turf 
Rampart”, in S. Applebaum, Roman Frontier Studies, 1967, 1971, 21. The turfs 
measured Ι χ 1.5 χ .5 Roman feet and were cut, carried and stack at a rate of five 
per man/hour, also the equivalent of ca. 1 cubic meter per day. Relatively 
unmotivated prisoners were used for this reconstruction.
101 J.D. Anderson, Roman Military Supply in North-East England, BAR British 
Series 224, 1994, 89, citing I. Baker, A Treatise on Masonry Construction, 
1909.
102 CIL 8Ἰ8042 Bb (Lambaesis): (munitiones) [quas] alii [per] plures dies 
divisis[sent, e]as uno die peregistis; murum lo[ngi] operis et qualis mansuris 
hibernaculis fieri solet non [mul]to diutius exstrucxistis, quam caespite 
exstruitur.
103 The soldiers of the Roman garrison in Judaea had been on campaign for at least 
five of the last six years, and had built circumvallations and other siege works 
on numerous occasions: Jos. BJ 3Ἰ78, 4Ἰ3, 5.261, 6.151, 7Ἰ90.
104 Richmond (n. 2), 153 estimated it took about a week, using the three-day 
circumvallation of Jerusalem (Jos. BJ 5.508-9) as a guide.
105 Jos. 57 7.280-303.
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have started immediately after Silva’s arrival, shortening the total length of the 
siege by five days.
The Roman forces guarding the perimeter, half a legion and all the auxiliaries, 
numbered about 5,800 soldiers, represented well over one man per meter of the 
circumvallation. This density of this force made a barrier wall superfluous, as the 
number of pickets would have made escape virtually impossible even without 
such a wall. The circumvallation may have been constructed primarily as “busy 
work” for the army. If this is so, it was so, it is less likely that Silva would have 
delayed the building of the ramp in deference to what was, strictly speaking, an 
unnecessary circumvallation.
The siege ramp
The building of the siege ramp was clearly the most time-consuming phase of the 
siege. The time needed to construct the ramp will be estimated in two ways. 
First, the original volume of the ramp will be calculated and the theoretical 
construction rate applied and an approximate figure derived for the necessary 
construction time. Second, the time recorded for the raising of ramps in other 
sieges will be evaluated and historical circumstances, which might lengthen or 
shorten the construction time needed, compared with those at the siege of 
Masada.
At first glance, the siege ramp at Masada appears enormous. However, the 
present appearance of the ramp differs considerably from its original size and 
shape. As noted in 1933 by von Lammerer and confirmed by a recent geologic 
survey by Dan Gill, the Roman ramp is built on top of a large natural spur. 106 
Thus, what is for the most part a natural earthen slope easily can be confused 
with an enormous Roman siege work. In addition, the situation of the ramp next 
to a deep wadi makes the siege ramp appear far larger than it is in reality.10'
Two thousand years of erosion have spread the remains of the siege ramp 
over this spur: at present the ramp is funnel-shaped, 225 meters long, some 50 
meters at the narrowest, lowest part and widening to some 220 meters at the 
top.108 The point, however, is not the present dimensions of the ramp, but those 
at the time of the siege. In the most thorough analysis to date, von Lammerer 
calculated that the siege ramp at Masada was originally 150 meters long and 25 
meters wide.109 The ascent of the slope is not constant, and the ramp’s height
106 Α. von Lammerer, “Der Angriffsdamm”, in Schulten (n. 2), 167, D. Gill, “Α 
Natural Spur at Masada”, Nature 362/12, Aug. 12, 1993, 569-70.
107 Josephus’ figure of 200 cubits (90 meters) for the ramp’s height (Jos. BJ 7.306) 
is probably measured from the bottom of the Wadi Sebbe next to it, Schulten (n. 
2), 171, Yadin (n. 2), 226, Gill (n. 106) 570. The present distance from the 
bottom of the Wadi Sebbe to the top of the ramp is 115 meters.
108 Gill (n. 106) 570.
109 Von Lammerer (n. 106), 169, 175.
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varied, from a maximum of 30 meters at the center to around 10 meters at either 
end."0 Taking the average thickness of the ramp to be 20 meters, the siege ramp 
at Masada contained approximately 37,500 cubic meters of earth and timber.1' 1 
The siege ramp at Masada was certainly large, but its building was by no means 
a phenomenal feat by the standards of Roman military engineering.
The building of siege ramps involved two steps: first the material had to be 
collected, then the ramp itself had to be constructed. In the case of Masada, the 
earth for the ramp was certainly excavated locally and, as argued above, was 
probably done by the corvée labor force at the site ."2 Indeed, the small hill 
behind the siege ramp, over which the circumvallation runs, may be the remains 
of a much larger hill from which this earth was removed.
Comparative evidence gives some idea of the amount of time needed for this 
excavation. According to field manuals from the American Civil War and World 
War I, inexperienced soldiers were expected to dig at a rate of ca. 3 cubic meters 
in an eight-hour day ."3 Earth could be transported for 100 meters by two men 
using a stretcher at a rate of ca. 6 cubic meters in 8 hours."4 Assuming that one- 
half of the 3,000 man corvée labor force at Masada was digging and the other 
half transporting the earth, sufficient earth could have been excavated and moved 
in under nine days.
Timber was also an important element of the siege ramp,10 23415 167and in the case of 
Masada all timber had to be brought in from elsewhere. It is possible that the 
siege ramp that had been used the previous year at Machaerus was dismantled 
and the timber removed to M asada."6 Other sources of wood were available, 
including the oasis of Jericho, the forest of Zoar and the forest of Jardes, on the 
north, south and east banks of the Dead Sea, respectively."7 This timber could
110 Ibid., plan XIII, cf. Gill (n. 106) 569.
111 I.e. 150 m. times 25 m. tiiues 20 m. divided by 2 (as a ramp would be half the 
volume of a cube of these dimensions). The estimate of Gill (n. 106), 569 of 
250,000 cubic meters appears to count a considerable portion of the natural 
slope as part of the ramp.
112 Cf. BAlex. 73.1.5, Front. Strat. 3.7.4.
113 Ε. Viele, Handbook of Field Fortifications, 1861, 24, [British] General Staff, 
Field Service Pocket Book, 1916, 104 (80 cubit feet per 8-hour day). This rate, 
however, could be greatly increased: enslaved African-Americans making bricks 
for the Confederate military dug clay at a rate of 9 to 12 cubic meters per day, C. 
Mohr, On the Threshold of Freedom: Masters and Slaves in Civil War Georeia, 
1986, 181.
114 General Staff (n. 113), 98: two men carry two cubic feet a distance of 50 yards 
every two minutes. The Romans did not use the wheel-barrow, which was 
introduced to the West in the Middle Ages.
115 Caes. BGal. 4·. 12.4, BCiv. 2.1, Lucan Phar. 3.394, 426, Kromayer and Veith (n. 
35), 444, Wimmel (n. 66) 37-8.
116 Jos. BJ 7Ἰ90.
117 The exact site of the forest of Jardes is unidentified, but Josephus says Bassus 
“pushed forward” (êpeigeto) to Jardes (Jos. BJ 7.210) so a location north of
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have been shipped across the Dead Sea to En Gedi and then transported to the 
siege by the same corvée labor which carried provisions. The most probable 
source of timber, however, was the hills around Hebron."8
The time required to gather material for the siege ramps need not be added tp 
its construction time. Since the siege of Masada was certainly planned ahead of 
time, the collection of timber probably began well before the army arrived at 
Masada. In addition, the excavation of earth and the movement of material to the 
ramp site, could have been going on at the same time that the siege ramp was 
under construction. There was no reason for Silva to wait until all the material 
for the ramp was ready, before beginning work on the siege ramp. After one day 
of excavations, sufficient material would be available to begin work on the ramp. 
However, even assuming that the Romans kept their legionaries inactive until all 
preparations were complete, these would have added at most 9 days to the siege.
There were 4,800 legionaries at Masada, but if the auxiliaries in Camp Ε were 
used to guard the western perimeter, only the five legionary cohorts in Camp F 
were garrisoned near enough to the siege ramp to have worked on it.18 19 
Therefore, only 2,400 soldiers (half a legion) were available to Silva for 
construction work. At first glance, it seems strange not to use the entire legion 
for construction, but this is due to a natural limit to the number of troops who 
could have worked effectively on the ramp.
Siege ramps were built by constructing large wooden revetments on either 
side, and filling them in with earth stabilized by timber.120 While there are 
various theories on exactly how ramps were constructed, a simple method was 
probably followed in most cases, including Masada. The revetments would have 
been pre-fabricated by the corvée laborers, out of harm’s way, then moved into 
position and secured by legionary soldiers. In the same way, earth and stabilizing 
timber also would have been transported to the base of the ramp by the civilian 
laborers, and then baskets of earth carried up the ramps by lines of soldiers. After 
dumping the earth, an equal number of line of soldiers would have passed back 
the empty baskets.121 Other teams would have packed down the earth,122 and 
have laid down stabilizing timbers.
Machaerus is unlikely, and to the east (in the Syrian desert) impossible. Α 
likely location is around the Arnon river.
118 Η. Cotton, personal correspondence.
119 Schulten (n. 2), 100, 106, Richmond (n. 2), 149-50. It would have made little 
sense to march soldiers from Camp B several miles each day to the site of the 
ramp.
120 Described in Sil. Ital. Punica 13.105, Lucan Phars. 3.394-8, and more prosaically 
by Thuc. 2.75.2. Kromayer and Veith (n. 35), 212-3. American Civil War field 
fortifications were also built with wooden revetments, Vide (n. 113), 5.
121 Cf. F. Lepper and S. Frere, Trajan’s Column, 1988, plate XV (scene XX). Plin.
Ν Η 33.71 describes the removal of gold ore by miners using this method. It is 
also possible that each soldier carried a basket up, dumped it, and returned, but
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If the Masada ramp was 25 meters wide, then only 20 such lines (half 
passing up, half passing back) could have fit (at a meter apart). Therefore, 
assuming 100 to 150 soldiers per line, a maximum of 2,000-3,000 soldiers could 
have effectively worked on the ramp. This explains why only half of the Tenth 
Legion would have been needed to build the Masada ramp.12 23 It is possible that 
construction was carried on twenty-four hours a day, in three eight hour shifts of 
800 men each.
Given Busolt’s construction rate of 1 cubic meter per soldier per day, the 
37,500 cubic meter siege ramp at Masada could have been completed by 2,400 
soldiers in less than 16 days. Put another way, the Masada ramp was raised at a 
rate of 1.25 meters in height per day. This construction rate of 2,400 cubic meters 
in volume per day, or 1.25 meter in height per day, agrees well with information 
drawn from the accounts of raising other siege ramps.
At Avaricum in Gaul, Caesar’s army took 25 days to build a ramp that was 
23.5 meters tall, probably 97.6 meters long and perhaps some 50 meters wide.124 
While the figures are problematic, and they are possibly too large, the volume of 
such a ramp would have been 57,300 cubic meters and the construction rate 
approximately 2,300 cubic meters per day. This work was accomplished despite 
heavy rains and fierce resistance from 40,000 Gauls.125 Even if the reconstruction 
of the total size of the Avaricum ramp is wrong, its height is explicitly given 
(80 Roman feet or 23.5 meters). The rate of construction was thus 0.94 meters a 
day, lower than that of the Masada ramp due to the defenders’ resistance.
In addition, the total time estimated for raising the siege ramp at Masada (21 
days) is in general agreement with that needed to raise other ramps, the 
dimensions of which are not known. Josephus’ Jewish War provides the most 
extensive survey of such data. Siege ramps were built at the siege of Jotapata in
the former method has the advantage that, in case of sortie, soldiers needed only 
to drop their baskets and draw their swords to be ready to fight as a unit.
122 According to Veg. Epit. 4.3 this was down with rods or poles {vectes).
123 In a siege in which resistance was expected, the other half of the legion would 
have provided security.
124 Caes. BGal. 7.24: diebus xxv aggerem latum pedes cccxxx, altum pedes Ixxx 
exstruxerunt. The ramp is probably being viewed from the side, and latus refers 
to the ramp’s length. The extraordinary width was probably because the ramp at 
Avaricum held two siege towers {BGal. 7Ἰ7), instead of a more normal single 
tower (as at Masada) and so was presumably twice as wide, but see Wimmel (n. 
66), 7-9.
125 Caes. BGal. 7.22-4, 28.
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20 or 22 days126 and at Gamla (two ramps, each by one legion) in 30 days.127 
At the siege of Jerusalem, a series of ramps were raised against the determined 
resistance of 23,000 defenders: those raised against the first wall took 15 days to 
complete, those against the second wall 17 days (and when these were destroyed, 
larger ones were completed in 21 days), those against the Temple wall were 
finished in 20 or 22 days, and finally two embankments built to capture the 
royal palace took 18 days to complete.128
All these ramps were of different size, and were built under different 
conditions, but it is noteworthy that the average time of construction for known 
siege ramps in the Jewish War was 20 days, with resistance.129 The lack of 
resistance at Masada would have allowed a faster rate of construction. It should 
be noted that the soldiers of the Tenth Legion were quite experienced with siege 
ramp construction. They had raised several aggeres at the siege of Jerusalem only 
three years before, and in the previous year had built one at Machaerus.130 In 
addition, the soldiers would have been highly motivated to finish the siege- 
work, and their stay in this unpleasant region, as quickly as possible.
The Stone Platform
After the siege ramp at Masada was completed, it was topped by a large stone 
platform (bêma lithôn megalôn), 50 cubits high and 50 wide (22.5 by 22.5 
m eters).131 132Josephus attributes the building of the platform to the need to 
provide a stable base for the battering ram,1̂ 2 thus the platform was probably
126 The siege began Artemisius 21 (Jos. BJ 3Ἰ42) and the works started eight days 
later (3Ἰ45, 149, 155, 157, 161), i.e. Artimisius 29. It was completed no later 
than Daesius 20, when three assault towers were placed on the completed 
embankment (3.282). The two day difference depends on which calendar 
Josephus is using: the Jewish counterpart of Artemisius (Iyar) has 29 days, the 
Julian (May) has 31.
127 Jos. BJ 4.83.
128 Jos. BJ 5.248-51, 302, 466, 6.5, 93, 149, 220, 376, 392.
129 According to the unemended text of Thuc. 2.75.3 the siege ramp raised by the 
Spartans at Platea took 70 days to construct. Busolt (n. 97), 967 note 2 thought 
this impossibly long. Suggestions for emendations have included 17 days 
(heptakaideka for ebdomêkonta) and more plausibly 20 days (Θ for O), Gomme 
(n. 98), 207. When Cicero took Pindenissum, a mountain fortress in Cilicia, 
using a siege ramp, the siege lasted for 57 days, but the site is unidentified and 
few details are known, Cic. Fam. 15.4.10, An. 5.20, see Μ. Wistrand, Cicero 
Imperator, 1979, 9.
130 Jos. BJ 5.302, 466, 6.5, 93, 149, 220, 7.190.
131 Jos. BJ 7.306.
132 Jos. BJ 7.307. At the siege of Atrax in 198 B.C., a wheeled siege tower almost 
collapsed because of loosely packed earth, Liv. 32.17.
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about 50 cubits long (22.5 meters) in order to accommodate the battering ram.133 
There are two ways of envisioning the stone platform: (1) as a stone ramp placed 
on top of the earthen ramp, and up which a wheeled siege tower or battering ram 
was pushed, (2) as a giant stone cube, placed at the end of the ramp onto which 
the siege equipment would have been hoisted. The latter reconstruction 
corresponds better to the image of a bêma, a word used both for steps and 
platforms. In addition, a cubic platform would have had the advantage of 
reducing the overall size of the ramp.
The top edge of the ramp presently reaches some 15 meters below the edge of 
the cliff. While Schulten assumed that the present height of the ramp included 
the remains of the stone platform,134 much of the stone may well have washed 
down into the Wadi Sebbe below over the millennia.135 Thus, the original top of 
the platform was probably at, or above, the bottom of the casement wall. The 
remains of this stone platform were described by de Saulcy in 1851 and by Lt. 
Conder, and it probably totally collapsed only in the 1927 earthquake.136
The stone platform was probably a more or less solid structure. It may have 
been hollow, though, like the brick turris constructed by the Romans at the base 
of the walls of Massilia during the siege of 49 B.C.137 If so, and if the 
dimensions above are correct, it contained some 11,400 cubic meters of stone and 
timber (though a ramp-like platform would be smaller). Assuming the same 
construction rate as for the ramp (1 cubic meter per soldier per day) 2,400 
legionaries could have constructed this platform in under five days.
Battering down the casement wall
Once the platform was completed, the Romans placed a battering ram on it and 
began smashing a hole in the casement wall. Josephus says that the battering 
down was done “with difficulty” (molis).138 The difficulty might have been 
caused by Jewish resistance or missile fire, but, as noted above, this is unlikely. 
The battering ram would have been well-protected. It probably sat on top of the
133 According to Vitr. De Arch. 10.15.6, a 31 meter long ram was considered 
especially long, cf. Richmond (n. 2), 154.
134 Schulten (n. 2), 171.
135 Yadin (n. 2), 226.
136 De Saulcy in Briinnow and Domaszewski (n. 12), 238: “La plate-forme qui [la 
jetée] couronnait s’est écroulée, par l’action des pluies et du temps sur le terrain 
peu solide qui lui servait de base; toute les pierres ont roulé dans les precipices 
béants à droite et à gauche”, C.R. Conder, Survey of Western Palestine: 
Memoirs III, 1883, 419: “On the mound is a wall of unhewn blocks, forming a 
sloping ascent some 70 feet high”. This “slope” does not necessarily reflect the 
platform’s original configuration and might have been the result of erosion.
137 Caes. BCiv. 2.8-10. The Roman army’s method of construction under fire, as 
described by Caesar in this passage, is instructive.
138 Jos. 57 7.310.
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stone platform,139 under a solid wooden roof, covered with leather hides (the 
testudo), at the level of the bottom of the casement wall.140 The testudo would 
have prevented the defenders from damaging the ram through rolling stones or 
fire.1'*'
When the stone platform was finished, the siege tower which had protected 
the siege ramp was almost certainly placed behind the platform (overlooking it) 
not on top of it.142 Josephus mentions the battering ram after describing the 
siege tower, but does not say it was in the tower, because it was not. The tower 
was 60 cubits high and the platform 50 cubits, and therefore the top of the tower 
would have been on the same level, or slightly above, the top of the casement 
wall. Therefore, the artillery and archers easily could have kept the Sicarii from 
interfering with the battering ram.143
If active resistance from the Sicarii did not cause the “difficulty” with the 
battering ram, it must have been some technical problem. On one hand, there may 
have been some difficulty in placing the ram and testudo in position: if the 
reconstruction given here is correct, both would have had to be lifted some 20 
meters from the surface of the ramp onto the stone platform. This operation, 
however, would not have been very troublesome, particularly since such winches 
could be positioned both of the stone platform and the siege tower. In addition, 
Josephus implies that the difficulty was met during the battering process.144
The outer casement wall of Masada is relatively thin, only 1.5 meters, and 
built without mortar.145 Under normal circumstances, it would have survived 
only a few hours of battering. But according to Josephus, after the stone wall 
was destroyed, a second wall became visible, made of timber and earth.146 In a 
recent article, Ehud Netzer has argued that this “wooden wall” was not behind 
and unattached to the casement wall, as was previously thought, but was built
139 As clearly indicated by Jos. BJ 7.307. Yadin (n. 2), 230 seems to have had this 
in mind.
140 Vitr. De Arch. 10.13.4, Veg. Epit. 4Ἰ4, Kromayer and Veith (n. 35), 219, 225.
141 Ο. Lendle, Schildkröten: Antike Kriegsmaschinen in poliorketischen Texten, 
1975, 6-25. Such a testudo is illustrated on the Arch of Septimius Severus, 
Brilliant (n. 81), 67.
142 As thought by Hawkes (n. 15), 199 and Schulten (n. 2), 96. Josephus (BJ 
7.309) mentions the battering ram after describing a siege tower, but does not 
say it was in the tower, because it was not.
143 Jos. BJ 7.30910, Veg. Epit. 4.27, Yadin (n. 2), 231. The tower would also have 
functioned as covered access to the stone platform.
144 Jos. BJ 7.310-11: en tautô de kai krion ho Silbas megan kataskeuasamenos, 
sunecheis keleusas poieisthai tô teichei tas embolas molis men all’oun 
anarrêxas ti meros katêreipse.
145 Schulten (n. 2), 14.
146 Jos. B J 7.311. The wall bears a certain resemblance to the “Gallic walls” 
described in Caes. BCal. 7.23ff., and the “inner wall” described in Veg. Epit. 
4.23, cf. Vitr. de Arch. 1.5.7, Liv. 38.6.1, Plin. NH 35.169.
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within it.147 According to his reconstruction, the hollow space between the inner 
and outer casement walls was filled with timber, and then another timber wall 
built 2.5 m behind the inner casement wall, and the intervening space filled with 
earth and timber, as described by Josephus.148 In fact, there is no reason to 
postulate a wall behind the casement wall at all, and it seems quite possible that 
the wooden wall was constructed entirely within the hollow space on the inner 
and outer casement walls. Either reconstruction fits the narrative of Josephus.
Josephus describes the casement wall and the wooden wall as separate 
structures, and indeed they are from the point of view of the spectator.149 A 
wooden wall placed behind the outer casement wall would have made the 
battering down more “difficult.” Vegetius describes a similar arrangement, saying 
that backing a stone wall with 20 feet of packed earth makes it impossible to 
batter down,150 but one should not exaggerate the delay caused by the timber 
wall at Masada, which was considerably smaller. Allotting one day to get the 
ram into position and three to batter down the outer casement wall adds another 
four days, maximum, to the siege.
Burning the wooden wall and taking the fortress
When the outer casement wall had been destroyed, the wooden wall (and the 
inner casement wall) still remained. The Romans certainly recognized that it 
would take time to batter down a wooden wall (which would absorb the shock 
of the ram), and setting the wall on fire was a relatively easy alternative.151 After 
the wall caught fire, Josephus says that the wind changed directions, first 
blowing the flames towards the Roman works (note the fear of the ramp 
burning) and then back towards to wall.152 Although Josephus does not mention 
it, after the fire had destroyed the wooden support, the inner casement wall could 
easily have been knocked down.
According to Josephus, the Romans waited overnight, until the morning of 
Xanthicus 16, to enter the fortress. Schulten found this delay remarkable, and 
Cohen used it to question the historicity of Josephus’ account.153 Yet the fire 
would have burned intensely for several hours, and may well have continued 
after dark. In this case, the Roman decision not to storm the fortress at night is
147 Ε. Netzer, “The Last Days and Hours at Masada”, Biblical Archaeological 
Review, Nov/Dec. 1991, 26-31. The wooden wall was constructed from beams 
taken from the roofs of buildings in the fortress. Netzer estimates that it would 
have taken “one to two weeks” to have built this wall, but since it would 
undoubtedly Have been begun long before the siege ramp was completed, this 
gives no indication for the length of the siege.
148 Jos. BJ 7.311-13,
149 This is not to imply that Josephus was personally at the siege.
150 Y e g  f ? p i t  4  3_
151 Jos. BJ 7.314. Netzer (n. 147), 32 explains the lack of archaeological remains.
152 Jos. BJ 7.317-9.
153 Schulten (n. 2), 177, Cohen (n. 90), 385-405.
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perfectly reasonable. Josephus says that when the Romans entered Masada they 
discovered that the entire Jewish garrison, with the exception of two women and 
five children, had committed suicide.154 15Whether or not the story of the suicide 
is true, or exaggerated, it is clear that the fortress was taken the day after the wall 
was battered down.
Conclusion
Assuming that the Roman forces began working immediately upon their arrival 
at Masada, and there is no reason to doubt this, and allowing seven days to 
build roads, five days for the circumvallation, nine days for preparations, 16 days 
to build the siege ramp and five for the stone platform means that only 42 days 
would have been needed from the arrival of the army at Masada to the 
completion of the siege works. Adding in four days for the battering and one to 
burn down the wooden wall gives a total of 47 days, or just under seven weeks.
It is possible, of course, that unforeseen and unmentioned delays slowed the 
siege. Adding two weeks to account for such possibilities would result in a total 
of nine weeks, just over two months for the siege, from beginning to end. 
Conversely, it is also possible, and indeed more likely, that the siege was shorter 
than seven weeks. Work on the roads might have begun before the arrival of the 
main force, and some of the steps in constructing the siege works might have 
overlapped, shortening the length of the siege. In addition, the estimated 
construction rate of one cubic meter per soldier per day is probably too low. It is 
certainly possible that the amount of time necessary to build the siege works 
might have been as short as a month.
All in all, a nine week siege is the likely maximum, a four week siege the 
likely minimum, and a siege of seven weeks the most probable length for the 
siege of Masada. Postulating a siege of some seven weeks fits in well with the 
date given by Josephus for the fall of the fortress, whatever calendar is being 
used.'55
154 Jos. BJ 7.400. Both Τ. Weiss-Rosmarin, “Masada, Josephus and Yadin”, Jewish 
Spectator 32/8, 1967, 29-32 and Cohen (n. 86), 403 challenged the historicity 
of the suicide, but see D. Ladouceur, “Josephus and Masada”, Josephus, Judaism 
and Christianity, edd. L. Feldman and G. Hata, 1987, 106-8.
155 Assuming that Josephus is using a Julian calendar, and Xanthicus 16 is an 
equivalent of April 16, then the siege might have begun on March 1 and have 
run for 46 days. If Josephus were using the Jewish calendar, one might think 
that Nisan 16 (i.e. Xanthicus 16) would fall around April 1, since Nisan runs 
from mid-March to mid-April. Α survey of the Jewish calendar for the years 
1800-2000, however, reveals that Nisan 16 fell on or before April 1 in less than 
10 percent of the years surveyed. Indeed, Nisan 16 fell on or after April 16 over 
42 percent of the time and Nisan 16 can fall as late at April 28. Of course, the 
Jewish calendar in the first century A.D. was not regulated in the same way as 
the present one, Herr (n. 8), but it is clear that a siege starting in March could 
easily have been completed by mid- to late April.
110 THE LENGTH OF THE SIEGE OF MASADA
Α combination of Josephus’ dramatic rhetoric and the striking topography of 
Masada (as well as perhaps the influence of politics) have misled scholars on the 
length on the siege of Masada. Ἀ careful analysis of the narrative account, an 
understanding of the parameters of Roman engineering capabilities and the 
recognition that the siege ramp lies on top of a sloping natural spur, suggest that 
the siege was a relatively short one. While the topography of Masada presented a 
challenge, overcoming the fortress was a straightforward application of Roman 
military technology by a small provincial force.
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